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EVIDENCE -

SEvEN YEARs ABsCE -

PRESUMPTION OF Tinm

oF DEATH. - A beneficiary of an insurance policy sued to recover
the amount of the proceeds on the ground that the insured disappeared and had not been heard of for seven years and thus was
presumed to be dead. A clause in the policy provided that suit
must be brought for recovery of the proceeds within one year
from date of death of the insured. Upon a judgment for defendant plaintiff obtained certiorari. It was held that in the
absence of facts or circumstances tending to establish the date of
death, death is presumed to have occurred at the expiration of the
seven year period.'
This principle is based by the court on the proposition that
when a thing is shown to exist, its continuance is presumed until
the contrary is shown or until a contrary presumption arises. In
the absence of facts tending to prove the fact of death before
the end of the seven year period, the court says that life will be
presumed to have continued during the entire period when the
contrary presumption of death from continued absence will arise.
Under a code provision for a legal presumption "of continuance
of life for seven years", the decision is plausible at least.
It
represents one American view. The lower court had followed
the English rule as laid down in Nepean v. Doe d. Knigt 2 that
the presumption of law relates only to the fact of death and the
time of death whenever it is material must be the subject of distinct proof.
That rule, which is followed by the United States
Supreme Court and many state courts,' was approved in the dissenting opinion.
Courts seem to use the word presumption in two senses, one
meaning, a logically permissible inference of fact which the judge
or jury may draw, but is not legally bound to draw, and the other,
a deduction which the law requires the court to draw. This latter view is based on the ground that common experience shows
the fact presumed to be so generally true that courts may start
with the proposition that it is true. Its legal effect stands until
appreciable evidence is introduced to rebut it, that is, it throws
upon the party against whom it operates the burden of going forward with the evidence. In this sense alone is the word presumption correctly used.'
I Gantt v. American National Insurance Co., 160 S. E. 345 (Ga. (1932).
:2 M & W. 894, 150 Eng. Reprint 1021 (1837).
'See collection of cases in note (1910) 26 L. R. A. (N. S.) 294.
44 WiGMOBR, EvmENOE (1905) § 2487.
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It is not common experience that persons absent for seven
years without tidings have lived for seven years and died at the
end of that period. Such a deduction is not, therefore, a true
presumption. And it cannot be wholly justified on the ground
that it is an artificial rather than a natural presumption based on
reasons of convenience and necessity rather than the probabilities
of truth.! The period is arbitrary but the fact of death itself is
presumed from general experience.! A legal presumption of the
continuance of life for seven years is inconsistent with the ground
for presuming the fact of death at the end of seven years. Moreover, it does not follow that because there are no circumstances
from which the precise time of death may be inferred that the existence of life for seven years with death at the end should be a
mandatory deduction. The conclusion arrived at is still an inference of fact. Courts are confusing terms when they call it a
presumption.
It is to be regretted that the distinction between the terms
is not more generally observed. Insurance companies in particular
have suffered from the operation of the presumption of death
from absence for seven years without tidings.' That claims have
been frequently allowed while the insured was still alive is
evidenced by attempts of the companies to evade the presumption
by enacting by-laws providing that absence, however long continued, shall not alone be evidence of death or that the company
shall not be liable upon proof of absence of the insured unless the
absence shall have extended for a period equal to his life expectancy. In states where this presumption is statutory these
5

Burr v. Sim, 4 Whart. 150, 33 Am. Dec. 50 (1838).
aIn Nepean v. Doe d. Knight, mpra n. 2, at 150 Eng. Reprint 1029, Lord
Denman said: "Now, when nothing is heard of a person for seven years
it is obviously a matter of complete uncertainty at what point of time in
those seven years he died; of all points of time the last day is the most
improbable and inconsistent with the ground of presuming the fact of death.
That presumption arises from the great lapse of time since the party has
been heard of; because it is considered extraordinary if he was alive that he
should not be heard of. In other words it is presumed that his not being
heard of has been occasioned by his death which presumption arises from the
considerable time that has elapsed. If you assume that he was alive on the
last day but one of the seven years, then there is nothing extraordinary in
his not having been heard of the last day; and the previous extraordinary
lapse of time during which he was not heard of has become immaterial by
reason of the assumption that he was living so lately. The presumption of
the fact of death seems to lead to the conclusion that death took place some
considerable time before the expiration of the seven years."
TVAoE, INsuRANo (2d ed. 1930) 74.
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by-laws have been held invalid. In view of these facts the requirement that suit on a policy must be brought within twelve
months after date of death of the insured seems warranted. At
any rate it is legal Because of the breadth of our country, the
migratory habits of our people, the facility and cheapness of transportation, the ease with which one can disappear in large cities
and the comparative safeness and convenience of life in remote
places fraudulent claims may be easily put forth. It does not
seem too severe that the claimant rather than the company should
have the burden of proof of time of death. For this reason the
decision of the lower court in accord with the English rule - that
the time of death whenever it is material must be established without the aid of a presumption - seems the better view.
-ELMABE

H. SIONTON.

8

tUnder W. VA. REV. CoDE (1931) c. 44, art. 9, § 31, probably invalid in
West Virginia.
9 M tropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Caudle, 122 Ga. 608, 50 S. E. 337

(1905).
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